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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This Court granted the State's Petition for Review which relates to the Idaho 
Court of Appeals' Opinion in State v. Hurles, Docket Number 39219, 2013 Opinion No. 
3 (Jan. 17, 2014) ("Opinion"). While the appeal in this matter was timely from the district 
court's judgment of conviction, the issues on appeal primarily relate to the restitution 
order accompanying the judgment of conviction. 
Kristie L. Hurles was employed at a bar and was charged with two counts of 
grand theft. One of the counts alleged that she embezzled proceeds from the bar's 
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lottery pull-tab game, and the other charge alleged that she embezzled money from the 
bar's ATM machine. Ms. Hurles' pleaded guilty to embezzling funds from the ATM 
machine and the State dismissed the charge related to the lottery pull-tab game. The 
amount of restitution in this matter became a hotly contested issued in this matter, and 
Ms. Hurles was ultimelty ordered to pay approximately $204,000. On appeal, 
Ms. Hurles made various challenges to the district court's restitution order. 
In the Opinion, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals held that the owners 
of the bar, Jody and Butch Morrison, who were also the holders of the accountant-client 
privilege, implicitly waived that privilege when they had their accountant cooperate with 
law enforcement while police were investigating Ms. Hurles' embezzlement. (Opinion, 
pp.5-8.) In the State's brief in support of its petition for review (hereinafter, 
Respondent's Brief on Review), it argued that there was no implicit waiver of the 
accountant-client privilege because the prosecution did not use any of the accountant's 
statements or work product to establish its restitution figure. Ms. Hurles argues that the 
Morrisons interjected their accountant's work product and communications into this 
matter when they had him cooperate with police to establish how much money was 
being embezzled. Ms. Hurles also argues that the waiver of the accountant-client 
privilege is broad and extends to all of the accountant's work product and 
communications regarding his investigation into Ms. Hurles' embezzlement. 
The Court of Appeals also reversed the restitution award because the district 
court awarded restitution for uncharged conduct, which was not contemplated in the 
plea agreement. (Opinion, pp.9-13.) The State disagrees with this holding and argues 
that Ms. Hurles expressly agreed to pay restitution for uncharged conduct when the 
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State mentioned at the change of plea hearing that it was going to "seek" restitution on 
all the "DRs" disclosed during discovery. Ms. Hurles argues that the reference to the 
"DRs" was clarified by the prosecutor at the end of the change of plea hearing when she 
said that Ms. Hurles agreed to pay restitution for a dismissed charge. Ms. Hurles also 
argues that the term "DRs" is at best ambiguous and, due to that ambiguity, the plea 
agreement should be interpreted in Ms. Hurles' favor. 
The Court of Appeals also reversed the restitution award as to some civil 
attorneys' fees which were brought by the Morrisons against various parties which had 
a tangential relationship to Ms. Hurles' criminal case. (Opinion, pp.13-15.) However, it 
also held that it was appropriate to award attorneys' fees for the Morrisons' intervention 
into Ms. Hurles' bankruptcy because it was the only way to prevent the criminal 
restitution award from being discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings. (Opinion, 
pp.15-16.) Ms. Hurles argues that under federal bankruptcy law, criminal restitution is 
automatically excepted from discharge in bankruptcy. Since the restitution was not 
dischargeable in the bankruptcy proceedings, the intervention was not necessary to 
protect the criminal restitution and, therefore, attorneys' fees for the intervention into the 
bankruptcy are not awardable as restitution. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Hurles was employed by Jody and Butch Morrison at the Crescent "No 
Lawyers Bar" and Grill (hereinafter, No Lawyers Bar), and was responsible for the 
business' bookkeeping. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2, 4.) 
In 2010, the Morrisons noticed that they were losing money from the proceeds of a 
lottery pull tab game. (PSI, p.2.) The Idaho Lottery helped the Morrisons investigate 
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the cause of their losses and determined that Ms. Hurles was stealing a portion of the 
lottery proceeds. (PSI, p.2.) A representative of the Idaho State Lottery later testified 
that the amount of money Ms. Hurles stole from the lottery pull tab proceeds was 
approxirnately$10,000. 1 (05/19/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-16, p.18, Ls.9-18.) 
As a result of that investigation and a subsequent change in the No Lawyers 
Bar's bookkeeping procedures, it was determined that Ms. Hurles was also responsible 
for stealing money from the Morrisons' petty cash, portions of which were supposed to 
be placed in the ATM machine located in the entrance of the No Lawyers Bar. (PSI, 
pp.3-4.) 
The No Lawyers Bar, as opposed to U.S. Bank, which owned the ATM, provided 
the funds for the ATM, and the bank would send the Bar a check with the fees it 
collected when a patron of the Bar took money out of the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.45, 
L.19 - p.46, L.25.) The Morrisons had a bookkeeping process whereby money was 
taken out of the safe which held petty cash and placed into the ATM. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.40, L.24 - p.42, L.10, p.44, L.4 - p.51, L.25.) The person who took the petty cash 
out of the safe would place an IOU in the safe, to keep a record of the amount of money 
taken out of the petty cash. (05/19/11 Tr., p.47, Ls.6-14.) To cover the amount of the 
IOU, Ms. Morrison would write a check which was drawn from proceeds generated 
during the previous day of business. (05/19/11 Tr., p.47, L.25 - p.48, L.5, p.74, L.15 -
p.75, L.4, p.76, Ls.5-8.) This bookkeeping process was done in order to maintain a 
steady balance of money in the petty cash and to track how much money was taken 
from the petty cash and placed into the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.48, Ls.6-22.) 
1 Ms. Hurles did not challenge this portion of the restitution award on appeal. 
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Ms. Hurles was one of two people, other than the Morrisons, who would 
replenish the cash in the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.47, Ls.15-18.) However, Ms. Morrison 
did not keep a daily log of the IOUs and threw the IOUs away after money taken from 
the petty cash was replaced. (05/19/11 Tr., p.65, L.21 - p.66, L.25, p.70, Ls.12-14.) 
As a result of an investigation into the ATM machine, Ms. Hurles eventually 
admitted that she had stolen funds from the A TM to compensate for the loss of her 
husband's job. (PSI, pp.3-4.) In order to accomplish the theft, Ms. Hurles would steal 
money by cashing a check and then placing only a portion of the proceeds into the 
ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-17.) 
Ms. Hurles was charged, by Information, with two counts of grand theft. 
(R., pp.28-29.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Hurles pleaded guilty to one count of 
grand theft which was related to the ATM thefts and, in return, the State dismissed the 
remaining count which related to the thefts from the lottery proceeds. (02/17/11 Tr., p.1, 
L.19- p.3, L.14; R., pp.33-34.) 
At the change of plea hearing, the State said that it was going to "seek restitution 
on all DRs that were disclosed in discovery." (02/17/11 Tr., p.1, Ls.19-22.) Ms. Hurles 
then admitted that she stole funds from the ATM for a period of one year, which began 
in December of 2008 and ended in December of 2009. (02/17/11 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, 
L.3.) After the district court accepted Ms. Hurles' guilty plea, the State clarified that the 
parties agreed that Ms. Hurles would pay restitution for the dismissed count related to 
the thefts from the lottery proceeds. (02/17/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-19.) 
The amount of restitution Ms. Hurles owed the Morrisons became a highly 
contested issue in this case. Ms. Hurles estimated that the amount of money she stole 
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from the ATM was approximately $20,000, while the Morrisons' former accountant, 
Mr. Warr, conducted an accounting and initially concluded the amount she stole from 
the ATM to be approximately $100,000. (PSI, pp.4, 213-214.) The Morrisons' 
restitution estimates for the ATM thefts oscillated from $284,000 to $90,000. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.79, Ls.20-25.) 
In order to calculate that amount of restitution Ms. Hurles embezzled from the 
ATM, the Morrisons partially relied on a spreadsheet created by the law firm Givens 
Pursley, which the Morrisons hired to litigate civil lawsuits tangentially related to 
Ms. Hurles' embezzlement. (05/19/11 Tr., p.24, L.16 - p.25, L.15.) Alison Berriochoa, 
a paralegal at Givens Pursley, was given the responsibility of creating the spreadsheet. 
(05tl 9/11 Tr., p.24, L.·16 - p.26, L.12.) Ms. Berriochoa partially relied on documents 
provided to her by Mr. Warr to create the spreadsheet. (05/19/11 Tr., p.71, L.3 - p.73, 
L.19.) Ms. Berriochoa ultimately concluded that Ms. Hurles stole $153,920. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.32, Ls.9-17.) 
At the restitution hearing, Ms. Berriochoa testified that the $153,920 figure was 
based on the total amount of the checks, but that total did not take into account the fact 
that Ms. Hurles deposited between eighty to ninety percent of the checks' proceeds into 
the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.34, Ls.7-18.) Ms. Berriochoa also testified that many of the 
checks were accidentally categorized as ones Ms. Hurles cashed when, in reality, they 
were endorsed by the Morrisons and, therefore, were probably cashed by the 
Morrisons. (05/19/11 Tr., p.34, L.19 - p.36, L.14.) Ms. Morrison also testified that the 
at least some of the checks Ms. Berriochoa accidentally accredited to Ms. Hurles' 
restitution total were in fact cashed by the Morrisons. (05/19/11 Tr., p.50, L.18 - p.51, 
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L.20.) Ms. Morrison also testified that two people with initials W.B. and D.S. also 
endorsed checks, but she does not know of any employees who had those initials. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.60, L.12 - p.61, L.14.) 
At the end of the restitution hearing, defense counsel stated that "what 
Ms. Hurles is telling me -- and it makes practical sense ... [s)he would cash [a] check, 
but bring back ... $900 of $1,000 ... " and place the $900 into the ATM. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.86, L.19 - p.87, L.3.) Defense counsel asserted, in the form of a question to 
Ms. Morrison, that the Morrisons' restitution figure was based on the entire amount of 
the checks and did not take into account that Ms. Hurles was only taking ten to twenty 
percent of the proceeds of the cashed checks. (05/'19/11 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-21.) When 
Ms. Morrison was asked how she proved the actual amount of money Ms. Hurles took 
from the ATM, she stated that she relied on Mr. Warr's documents and calculations. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.71, L.21 - p.73, L.10.) Defense counsel also asked Ms. Morrison if she 
ever "told your accountant at time that you and [Mr. Morrison] were taking money from 
this ATM account through the same method" as Ms. Hurles. (05/19/11 Tr., p.75, Ls.12-
15.) Ms. Morrison denied that allegation. (05/19/11 Tr., p.75, Ls.20-23.) Defense 
counsel then stated he wanted to call Mr. Warr to testify and made an offer of proof that 
Mr. Warr would testify that the Morrisons could not even establish that Ms. Hurles stole 
$90,000. (05/19/11 Tr., p.79, Ls.20-25.) Trial counsel also stated that he looked over 
the spreadsheet with Mr. Warr and they both noticed that "a lot of the information" in the 
spreadsheet was "incorrect." (05/19/11 Tr., p.80, L.23 - p.81, L.2.) 
Due to time constraints, the restitution hearing was continued and Mr. Warr did 
not testify. (05/19/11 Tr., p.80, L.1 - p.81, L.4, p.90, Ls.4-14.) The district court stated 
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that the State should provide what additional information was necessary to defense 
counsel or "[w]hat ever you think you need to make sure your client has had a fair ability 
to show the amount of restitution that's due and owing." (05/19/11 Tr., p.89, L.23 -
p.90, L.12.) 
At the second restitution hearing, Mr. Warr was sworn in and began to testify. 
(08/04/11 Tr., p.10, L.13- p.12, L.3.) When asked the first question pertaining to the 
restitution issue, the State invoked the accountant-client privilege on behalf of the 
Morrisons. (08/04/11 Tr., p.12, Ls.4-12.) Defense counsel implicitly stated he needed 
the testimony from Mr. Warr because the Morrisons' restitution estimate was unreliable, 
as it kept changing and had ranged from $400,000 to $100,000.2 (08/04/1'1 Tr., p.15, 
Ls.15-17.) The State then argued that Mr. Warr already provided his restitution 
calculations during the presentence investigation and he established that Ms. Hurles 
stole $100,000. (08/04/11 Tr., p.16, L.14 - p.17, L.11.) It further argued that Mr. Warr's 
reports were already in the record and could be relied on by the court, but the Morrisons 
could prevent him from testifying about those reports because they controlled the 
accountant-client privilege. (08/04/11 Tr., p.16, L.14 - p.17, L.11.) Defense counsel 
argued that the Morrisons implicitly waived the privilege because they used the 
documents created by Mr. Warr for the presentence investigation to establish the 
amount of restitution. (08/04/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.12-16.) Defense counsel also asserted 
that he needed Mr. Warr to testify in order to impeach Ms. Morrison with admissions she 
2 The amount of restitution being sought changed again at that hearing as the State 
noted that it had come up with $6,600 in additional corrections. (08/04/11 Tr., p.16, 
Ls.14-18.) 
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made to Mr. Warr. (08/04/1 '1 Tr., p.21, L.24 - p.22, L.13.) The district court excused 
Mr. Warr from testifying entirely. (08/04/11 Tr., p.15, L.25- p.16, L.1.) 
At a consolidated restitution/sentencing hearing, the district court began by 
noting that the victims were asking for $240,174 in restitution. (08/11/11 Tr., p.95, 
Ls.15-17.) The issue of the accountant-client privilege was addressed and defense 
counsel argued that Ms. Morrison waived the privilege by discussing conversations she 
had with her accountant at the first restitution hearing. (08/11/11 Tr., p.96, L.5 - p.97, 
L.22.) Defense counsel also argued that the privilege was waived because Mr. Warr 
was the State's witness and it was the State which told defense counsel to speak with 
Mr. Warr about the amount of restitution Ms. Hurles owed the Morrisons. (08/11/11 
Tr., p.99, Ls.5-25.) The State also pointed out that Ms. Hurles' husband alleged in the 
PSI that the Morrisons lied to the district court about the amount of restitution in order to 
get revenge against Ms. Hurles. (08/11/11 Tr., p.109, Ls.13-16.) Ms. Hurles was 
ultimately order to pay approximately 155,000 for the embezzlement from the ATM and 
the lottery pull-tab game. (R., pp.71-72.) 
As mentioned above, the Morrisons had also hired the firm Givens Pursley to 
litigate issues tangentially associated with the criminal case. (05/19/11 Tr., p.84, Ls.5-
10.) Those lawsuits were against Mr. Warr, Mr. Warr's firm, and U.S. Bank, and 
included an intervention into Ms. Hurles' bankruptcy case.3 (08/11/11 Tr., p.118, Ls.18-
24; PSI, p.52; Opinion, p.13.) The district court ruled that Ms. Hurles would have to pay 
the attorneys' fees for all of this litigation. (05/19/11 Tr., p.84, Ls.11-17.) Ms. Hurles 
3 Defense counsel erroneously stated that the lawsuit was against Bank of America, as 
opposed to U.S. Bank. (PSI, p.52.) 
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objected to the inclusion of the attorneys' fees in the criminal restitution award. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.84, Ls.18-·19.) At the second restitution hearing, the State requested 
$48,734.61 in civil attorneys' fees, all of which were awarded by the district court. 
(08/04/11 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-24; 08/11/11 Tr., p.132, Ls.4-6, p.135, Ls.17-25; R, pp.67-72.) 
The district court ordered Ms. Hurles to pay approximately $204,000 in restitution which 
included both the embezzlement restitution and the attorneys' fees. (R., pp.71-72.) The 
district court also imposed a unified sentence of 14 years, with two years fixed. 
(R., pp.67-68.) Ms. Hurles timely appealed. (R., pp.73-76.) 
On appeal, Ms. Hurles argued that the Morrisons implicitly waived the 
accountant-client privilege when they had Mr. Warr participate in the police investigation 
and when the State, through Ms. Morrison, partially relied on his calculations and 
communications to establish their restitution calculation. She also argued that the 
restitution award was not supported by substantial and competent evidence because 
the spreadsheet created by Ms. Berriochoa did not take into consideration the 
uncontested fact that Ms. Hurles only stole a small percentage of the proceeds of each 
cashed check. As a subcomponent of the foregoing argument, Ms. Hurles argued that 
the restitution award was not supported by substantial and competent evidence 
because it included restitution for uncharged conduct. Ms. Hurles also argued that civil 
attorneys' fees are not awardable as criminal restitution. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with some of Ms. Hurles' claims of error and 
reversed the district court on the privilege issue, remanding this case with instructions to 
have Mr. Warr testify as to his involvement in the police investigation. The Court of 
Appeals also held that the restitution award was not supported by substantial and 
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competent evidence because there was no causal relationship between Ms. Hurles' 
thefts from December 2008 to December 2009 and the uncharged conduct which 
allegedly occurred from 2005 to November of 2008. The Court of Appeals also 
reversed the restitution award as to a portion of the civil attorneys' fees. The State then 
filed a petition for review which was granted by this Court. 
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1. the district court err when it concluded that the Morrisons did not implicitly 
the accountant-client privilege? 
Was the district court's restitution calculation supported by substantial and 
competent evidence? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it included civil attorneys' fees as 
part of the restitution awarded in the criminal proceedings? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Morrisons Did Not Implicitly 
Waive The Accountant-Client Privilege 
Introduction 
The Morrisons implicitly waived the accountant-client privilege as to Mr. Warr's 
involvement with the calculation of restitution because they did nothing in this matter to 
protect their accountant-client privilege until Mr. Warr was called to testify on 
Hurles' behalf at the second restitution hearing. Prior to that hearing, the Morrisons 
had their accountant collaborate with police; the State subpoenaed Mr. Warr to testify at 
the original restitution hearing; trial counsel was asked to meet with Mr. Warr to discuss 
the restitution issues, which he did. At the first restitution hearing, Ms. Morrison relied 
on Mr. Warr's word product and she disclosed the contents of her conversations with 
Mr. Warr. The Morrisons also sued Mr. Warr. As such, the Morrisons waived their 
accountant-client privilege because their actions were not consistent with the actions of 
a party protecting a privilege. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Morrisons Did Not Implicitly 
Waive The Accountant-Client Privilege 
1. Ms. Hurles Did Not Abandon Her Claim As To the Privilege Issue By Her 
Decision To Forgo Filing A Motion To Reconsider The District Court's 
Ruling On The Privilege Issue 
As a preliminary matter, the State argues that Ms. Hurles waived any appellate 
claims she has in regard to the implicit waiver of the account-client privilege because 
Ms. Hurles never provided the district court an opportunity to make an adverse ruling as 
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to that issue. (Respondent's Brief On Review, pp.20-23.) Contrary to the State's 
assertion, Ms. Hurles did not abandon her claim of error related to the accountant-client 
privilege issue. 
At the second restitution hearing, Ms. Hurles called the Morrisons' accountant, 
Mr. Warr, to testify and the Morrisons invoked the accountant-client privilege. (08/04/'11 
Tr., p.10, L.13 - p.12, L.12.) After hearing a brief argument, the district court ruled that 
the Morrisons appropriately invoked the accountant-client privilege and excused 
Mr. Warr from testifying. (08/04/11 Tr., p.12, L.16 - p.16, L.1.) At the final 
restitution/sentencing hearing, trial counsel proffered additional reasons why the court 
should revisit its prior ruling about the applicability of the accountant-client privilege. 
(08/11/11 Tr., p.96, L.5 - p.98, L.7.) The district court then stated that it was going to 
"order the restitution that's been provided to me at this point" and that it was willing to 
revisit the privilege issue in the event trial counsel filed a "motion to reconsider." 
(08/11/11 Tr., p.98, L.9 - p.99, L.1.) The district court then awarded the Morrisons all of 
the restitution requested by the State. (08/11/11 Tr., p.103, Ls.9-12.) Trial counsel 
never filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's accountant-client privilege ruling. 
Based on the foregoing facts, the State argues that Ms. Hurles abandoned her 
ability to raise an appellate challenge as to the district court's ruling on the privilege 
issue because Ms. Hurles never filed a motion to reconsider the district court's prior 
ruling. (Respondent's Brief On Review, pp.20-23.) In support of this position, the State 
cites to State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378 (1999). In that case, the defendant filed a 
suppression motion but never followed up on it, and the district court never ruled on the 
motion. Id. at 384. This Court refused to address the suppression issue on appeal 
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because an appellate court "will not 'review a trial court's alleged error on appeal unless 
the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the assignment of 
error."' Id. (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481,485 (1993)). 
The Barnes case is inapposite, as there were multiple rulings on the privilege 
issue in this matter. The first ruling occurred at the second restitution hearing, where 
the accountant-client privilege was invoked, the district court found a privilege existed, 
and the district court excused Mr. Warr from testifying. (08/04/11 Tr., p.12, L.4 - p.16, 
L.1.) The second ruling on the issue occurred when the district court imposed the full 
amount of restitution at the restitution/sentencing hearing. (08/11/11 Tr., p.103, Ls.9-12; 
R., pp.71-72.) While the State argues that Ms. Hurles abandoned her claim, that is not 
accurate, as the district court ruled on the privilege issue and imposed all of the 
restitution requested by the State. The district court's invitation for Ms. Hurles to file a 
motion for reconsideration of its prior ruling on the accountant-client privilege issue does 
not mean, as the State asserts, that the district court failed to rule on the privilege issue. 
Concerning the same issue, the State also argues that the district court did not 
rule on the new arguments proffered by trial counsel at the final restitution/sentencing 
hearing because trial counsel based some of those arguments on his memory of the 
original restitution hearing and the district court requested that Ms. Hurles provide it with 
a transcript of that hearing. (Respondent's Brief On Review, pp.20-21.) This argument 
suffers from the same infirmities as the prior argument. Just because the district court 
invited trial counsel to provide more information to support an argument does not 
change the fact that the district court ruled against Ms. Hurles as to the arguments she 
advanced at the final restitution/sentencing hearing. 
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In sum, the accountant-client waiver issue was preserved for appeal when the 
district court held that a privilege existed and excused Mr. Warr from testifying. The 
new arguments made by trial counsel at the final restitution/sentencing hearing were 
likewise preserved for appeal when the district court ordered the full amount of 
restitution requested by the State without providing Ms. Hurles an opportunity to have 
Mr. Warr testify. 
2. The District Court Erred When It Ruled That The Morrisons Did Not 
Implicitly Waive The Accountant-Client Privilege 
The Morrisons implicitly waived the accountant-client privilege because they put 
actually Mr. Warr's analysis at issue and did nothing in this matter to protect their 
privilege until Mr. Warr was called to testify on Ms. Hurles' behalf at the second 
restitution hearing. Ms. Hurles argues that the waiver in this matter was broad and 
relates to all of Mr. Warr's work product and communications regarding the amount of 
money Ms. Hurles embezzled from the No Lawyers Bar. In the event Mr. Warr learned 
during his investigation into Ms. Hurles' embezzlement, that people other than 
Ms. Hurles were taking money from the ATM, the waiver in this case was broad enough 
to include that subject matter. 
The accountant-client privilege is set forth in Idaho Rule of Evidence 515 and 
Idaho Code Section 9-203A. Idaho Rule of Evidence 510 sets forth circumstances 
under which a privilege is implicitly waived, which follows: 
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of 
the confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person 
or the person's predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily 
discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or 




I.R.E. 510.4 An implicit waiver of any privilege exists when the holder of a privilege 
voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of "any significant part of the matter 
or communication." I.R.E. 510. This Rule provides for a broad waiver, which 
encompasses the entire subject matter relating to the waiver, not just the specific 
information disclosed. 
While not directly dealing with I.R.E. 510, this Court has provided further 
guidance over the implicit waiver of a privilege. In Skelton v. Spencer, 98 Idaho 417, 
418 ( 1977), the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants seeking specific 
performance of certain settlement agreements. When the settlement agreements were 
first executed, the defendants were initially satisfied with them. Id. However, one of the 
defendants, Louise Spencer, changed her mind and refused to perform her contractual 
obligations. Id. The plaintiffs then sued Ms. Spencer for specific performance of the 
settlement agreements. Id. As part of her defense, Ms. Spencer filed an affidavit 
wherein she asserted that the settlement agreement was the result of fraud and duress 
perpetrated by, among other people, her former attorneys, who represented her during 
the settlement agreement negotiations. Id. At trial, and over Ms. Spencer's invocation 
of the attorney-client privilege, her former attorneys testified as to the content of their 
4 While not raised below, it appears that the I.RE. 515 actually provides an express 
exception to the accountant-client privilege under circumstances where the client, the 
holder of the privilege, provides his/her accountant with false information. According to 
I.RE. 515(d) there "is no privilege under this rule," as "to a communication relevant to 
an issue of breach of duty by the accountant to the client or by the client to the 
accountant." I.RE 515(d)(3) (emphasis added). In the event this case is remanded for 
another restitution hearing, this exception to the accountant-client privilege will enable 
Mr. Warr to testify as to any communications he had with the Morrisons pertaining to the 
issue of whether they provided him false information during his investigation into 
Ms. Hurles embezzlement. 
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conversations with Ms. Spencer. Id. at 418-419. The trial court ultimately concluded 
that the former attorneys did not engage in fraud or duress during those conversations. 
Id. Ms. Spencer appealed. Id. 
On appeal, Ms. Spencer's primary argument was that the district court erred 
when it concluded that she implicitly waived her attorney-client privilege. Id. at 419. 
While interpreting the applicable statue, I.C § 9-203, the Idaho Supreme Court first 
reasoned that consent under the statue could be either express or implied, and when 
consent is found, the privilege is waived. Id. The Supreme Court then held as follows: 
This Court has also recognized that the attorney-client privilege is a 
defensive shield and not an offensive sword. Here, in support of her 
defense to the action for specific performance, Mrs. Spencer "testified" both 
to her communications with her attorneys throughout the settlement 
process and to the nature of their relation with her while discharging their 
duties as her attorneys. Having attacked the settlement agreements by this 
evidence, appellants then sought to prevent respondents from asking 
certain questions of appellant Louise Spencer's former attorneys, who were 
the other participants to the conversations so exposed and whose 
reputation and professional integrity were impugned. 
In these circumstances, appellant Louise Spencer's testimony 
impliedly consented to the disclosure of information she was otherwise 
privileged to withhold. Fairness requires that what she had disclosed could 
not later be withheld. Moreover, having herself disclosed communications 
and conduct otherwise privileged from disclosure, the rationale behind the 
privilege would no longer be served by recognizing appellant Louise 
Spencer's efforts to invoke it as a bar to the testimony of her former 
attorneys. 
By testifying to privileged communications, and by making an issue of her 
defense the privileged matter of her relation with her former attorneys, 
appellant Louise Spencer waived the attorney-client privilege for all 
communications relevant to the settlement process and the conduct of her 
former attorneys. 
Id. at 420-421 (citation omitted). 
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In this case, the Morrisons implicitly waived the accountant-client privilege by 
injecting his work into this case and by relying on Mr. Warr's documents to calculate the 
amount of restitution. At the second restitution hearing, defense counsel made the 
following objection to Ms. Morrison's invocation of the accountant-client privilege, "here 
is my problem. They're going to use Mr. Warr's documents for the presentence 
investigation, they can't claim privilege and turn around and say, okay, he can't testify 
as to what those documents are." (08/04/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.12-16.) Defense counsel also 
objected on the basis that Ms. Morrisons' decision to discuss the contents of Mr. Warr's 
work product constitutes a waiver. (08/11/11 Tr., p.97, Ls.14-16.) 
The Morrisons' reliance on Mr. Warr's work product during the presentence 
process also waived the accountant-client privilege. The presentence investigator 
stated that the Morrisons did not keep a log of the amount of money that went into the 
ATM "but they had their accountant come up with an amount of loss from the ATM." 
(PSI, p.3.) Ms. Morrison told the presentence investigator that "[b]ased on further 
investigation, her confession and in depth accounting we had proof [that Ms. Hurles 
stole money from the ATM]." (PSI, p.5 (emphasis added).) 
At the first restitution hearing, before the accountant-client privilege was invoked, 
Ms. Morrison partially relied on Mr. Warr's work product to establish her restitution 
calculation. When asked how she calculated the amount of money Ms. Hurles stole, 
Ms. Morrison replied as follows: 
I have records from my then accountant, James Warr, who showed 
an imbalance in the credits and the debits of the ATM of checks written to 
the ATM; credits meaning the money that was dispensed and paid back to 
my bank account from the ATM company. And those differences are what 
you see in column 4, I believe it is, a total of 154-some-thousand-dollars. 
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I don't know if I am in the right column. But those differences 
between what he tracked as being what was supposed to be money in and 
money out is $139,000, I think it is. 
Q [Defense Counsel]. Okay. Just for our purposes, what am I 
talking about here is what he tracked to you is that the ATM figures were 
inflated? 
A [Ms. Morrison]. Correct. They were not correct. 
Q [Defense Counsel]. You say that you have got records to 
show where the cash went once it was cashed at the bank; is that right? 
A [Ms. Morrison]. I have accounting records from my accountant 
that show that the checks that were written to - supposed to be deposited 
into the ATM are short- are short by about $139,000. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.71, L.21 - p.73, L.10.) \/\/hen asked about her records of cash 
transactions she stated "I have records of them. I have - we have daily cash recordings 
that we do every day. We have a monthly spreadsheet that is provided to my 
accountant." (05/19/11 Tr., p.77, L.23 - p.78, L.1.) 
Even after invoking the accountant-client privilege, the State still relied on 
Mr. Warr's work product: 
And again, Your Honor, the figures that Mr. Warr did give that were 
reflected in the police reports, have already been provided in the form of 
the presentence investigation, and so part of the invocation there, that's 
their privilege, that's their right to invoke it, but from the state's perspective, 
his view that there was a theft, and the fact that it was over $100,000 is 
already documented in the police reports, and so I think we can go forward, 
from the state's view, with that as background that has already been 
provided by that witness and is attached to the presentence report and 
that's part of the original police reports. 
(08/04/11 Tr., p.16, L.25-p.17, L.11.) 
Defense counsel also argued that Ms. Morrison waived the privilege because she 
disclosed communications between herself and Mr. Warr. Defense counsel made the 
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following objection at the second restitution hearing, "VVhen Ms. Morrison testified, my 
recollection is that she had a - she spoke on - in either direct examination or on cross 
examination, about conversations she had with her accountant, which I think, waives 
the accountant/client privilege." (08/11/11 Tr., p.96, Ls.5-10.) During the initial 
investigation concerning the ATM, Mr. Warr participated with the Boise Police 
Department and explained how the internal bookkeeping operations of the No Lawyers 
Bar functioned. (PSI, p.214.) During the first restitution hearing, Ms. Morrison also 
testified that Mr. Warr told her about a $1,300 accounting discrepancy, and that he had 
created new book keeping procedures for the No Lawyers Bar after discovering various 
accounting problems and Ms. Hurles' theft. (05/'19/11 Tr., p.62, L.24 - p. 70, L.11.) 
Additionally, defense counsel met with Mr. Warr and discussed the amount of 
restitution. At the restitution/sentencing hearing defense counsel stated, "Your Honor, 
this is a witness given to me by the state, subpoenaed by the State to the original 
restitution hearing. No privilege was ever requested." (08/11/11 Tr., p.97, Ls.17-20.) 
The following dialogue is from the original restitution hearing: 
Q [Defense Counsel]. Okay. And through this process, were you 
able to detect this amount of loss? 
A [Ms. Morrison]. No, because that's not where the amount of loss was 
coming from. 
Q [Defense Counsel]. So what I'm saying is, isn't it possible that 
Ms. Hurles wasn't cashing all of these checks but, instead, returning a 
significant portion back to the bar? 
A [Ms. Morrison]. I think that she's already admitted in her PSI that she 
would take checks to the bank and cash them, and a portion of that 
proceeds would go into the ATM. So I think that's pretty clear. 
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Q [Defense Counsel]. 
today, then, we are just cataloging single 
is for that full amou is that 
we are doing 
and saying 
[Defense Counsel]: Well, everyone agrees that she didn't take the full 
amount of these checks. 
THE COURT: I don't think everyone agrees to that. 
[Defense Counsel]: The problem is - and you're going to hear from the 
accountant - is that we just don't have the records to establish that. They 
say that. ... [T]his figure has gone from $90 to $284,000 back down to 
$160,000. And the amount-
THE COURT: Okay. So you're going to call an accountant yet today? 
[Defense Counsel]: I apologize for that. I can tell the court, too, that 
there [are] a lot of layers to this thing. And as I went and met with Givens 
Pursley, as I went and met with the accountant .... 
(05/19/11 Tr., p. 78, L.6 p.80, L.16.) The district court initiated the following dialogue 
at the second restitution hearing: 
Looks to me like the only thing that - that stands between the 
restitution figure being requested and the client paying that amount is 
potentially whether or not the - you can impeach the victim through the 
accountant. 
A [Defense Counsel]. Correct. 
Q [The Court]. Is that what you want to do? 
A [Defense Counsel]. Correct. 
Q [The Court]. And I'm just curious; why is it - how did you gain 
knowledge that the accountant may have information that would be 
impeaching? 
A [Defense Counsel]. 
is the state's witness. 
Judge, like I said, Mr. Warr was originally - he 
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[The Court]. Did talk to him? 
A [Defense Counsel]. he was su 
Q [The Court]. You talked to him? 
A [Defense Counsel]. 
Q [The Court]. 
point. 
So 
I did talk to him. 
potentially breached client relationship at that 
(08/11/11 Tr., p.98, L.22 - p.99, L.17.) The decision to have defense counsel 
with Mr. Warr over the amount of restitution and how he calculated that amount 
constituted was a continuation of an overall display of behavior inconsistent with a party 
protecting a privilege. Moreover, Morrisons Mr. Warr and his accounting firm. 
(08/04/11 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-18.) This position is also consistent with I.R. 510 which 
states that the holder of a privilege waives the privilege ifs/he "consents to disclosure of 
any significant part of the matter or communication." The Morrisons put Mr. Warr's work 
product at issue when they had him participate in the police investigation, relied on his 
work during the presentence investigation, testified about his work product and 
confidential conversations at the original restitution hearing, had defense counsel 
contact him to discuss his restitution calculations, and then sued him. 
Mr. Warr's testimony is necessary because it is the only means by which the 
district court and Ms. Hurles could get an accurate restitution figure. The Morrisons 
indicated that there was no log of the amount of money that went into the A TM each 
day, but they had their accountant come up with an amount of loss from the ATM. (PSI, 
p.3; 05/19/11 Tr., p.65, L.21 - p.66, L.9; p.70, Ls.12-14.) Since Ms. Hurles was cashing 
checks, then returning a portion of the proceeds into the ATM, there is no way of 
calculating the restitution without Mr. Warr's testimony. 
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Mr. Warr's testimony was also necessary to impeach Ms. Morrison. Defense 
counsel alleged that the Morrisons were taking money from the ATM in the same 
manner as Ms. Hurles. (05/19/11 Tr., p. 75, Ls.12-15.) The implication is that the 
Morrisons were asking for money they took from the ATM to be included in the 
restitution award. However, Ms. Morrison testified that neither she nor her husband 
borrowed money from the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.62, Ls.2-23, p.67, L.16 - p.68, L.7, 
p.75, Ls.20-23.) When Ms. Morrison was asked "Didn't your accountant actually 
confront you with the checks signed and endorsed by [Mr. Morrison], and you denied it 
for five months," Ms. Morrison answered no. (05/19/11 Tr., p.69, Ls.22-25.) When 
pressed, Ms. Morrison admitted that she had taken money from the ATM on two 
occasions. (05/'19/11 Tr., p.67, L.16 - p.69, L.21.) As such, Ms. Hurles needs the 
testimony of Mr. Warr to impeach Ms. Morrison over her assertion that the Morrisons 
were not taking money out of the ATM. If defense counsel's allegation is true, then 
Ms. Morrison knowingly lied to the court by inflating the amount of money Ms. Hurles 
stole from the Morrisons. According to defense counsel, "even hiring a CPA is not 
going to be able to get us to the admissions made by the alleged victims in this case, 
which is really what we needed from Mr. Warr anyway .... " (08/04/11 Tr., p.22, Ls.7-
10.) 
On review, the State argues that, even if there was an implicit waiver, that waiver 
was limited to Mr. Warr's work product regarding the initial police investigation and does 
not extend to communications between Mr. Warr and the Morrisons. (Respondent's 
Brief On Review, p.26.) Ms. Hurles argues that this is an overly narrow view of the 
scope of the Morrisons' waiver in this matter. Guidance as to the scope of a waiver of 
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can in the of 5th Amendment privilege 
self-incrimination. This Court held that once the privilege has been waived 
is broad and relates to all matters related to the same subject. This Court's holding 
follows: 
[A] defendant may not selectively assert his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination in order to control what information is before the 
court. The general rule regarding waiver of the privilege is that "a witness, 
in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then 
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the 
details." Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 
1311-12, 143 L.Ed.2d 424, 433 (1999) (citing Rogers v. United States, 
340 U.S. 367, 373, 71 S.Ct. 438, 442, 95 L.Ed. 344, 349 (1951 )). 
Thus, when a defendant puts a matter before the sentencing court, 
thereby waiving privilege, the defendant may not then invoke the 
privilege as to other matters related to the same subject. 
State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314, 322 (2012). In this case, the Morrisons had Mr. Warr 
do more than just turn over some documents to the police. Instead, he actually 
explained his work product and worked with the police in the initial police investigation. 
(PSI, pp.213-214.) As mentioned above, trial counsel asserted that there was a five 
month period where Mr. Warr was confronting the Morrisons about checks signed and 
endorsed by the Morrisons. (05/19/11 Tr., p.69, Ls.22-25.) If Mr. Warr gained 
information during the initial police investigation, which led him to believe that the 
Morrisons were also taking money from the ATM, then any privilege as to that 
information was waived when the Morrisons had Mr. Warr participate in the investigation 
of Ms. Hurles' embezzlement, as that is a matter related to the subject of the amount of 
money Ms. Hurles embezzled. 
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In sum, the Morrisons implicitly waived the accountant-client privilege as to the 
documents and conversations used to establish the amount of restitution Ms. Hurles 
owes the Morrisons. This was a broad waiver which relates to all of the information and 
communications Mr. Warr had in regard to the investigation into Ms. Hurles' 
embezzlement. This is important because there is a possibility that defense counsel's 
assertions are correct, which means that the current amount of restitution was 
intentionally inflated by the Morrisons and Mr. V\/arr's testimony is the best means to 
establish an accurate restitution award. As such, the district court erred when it 
determined that the Morrisons did not waive the accountant-client privilege and, in doing 
so, it might have enabled the Morrisons to get away with perjury. 
11. 
The District Court's Restitution Calculation Was Not Supported By Substantial And 
Competent Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Warr, a certified public accountant, performed a professional accounting of 
the Morrisons' losses and concluded that the Morrisons were missing approximately 
$100,000.5 (PSI, pp.3, 213-214.) Mr. Warr told the police that there were no daily logs 
recording the amount of money that was deposited into the ATM. (PSI, pp.213-214.) 
Due to this poor record keeping, Mr. Warr determined the amount of losses by 
comparing the deposits U.S. Bank received from the ATM with an internal log of 
deposits recorded by the ATM. (PSI, pp.213-214.) 
5 It is not clear from the record whether Mr. Warr's $100,000 figure was entirely 
attributable to Ms. Hurles' thefts or whether this figure includes funds taken from the 
ATM by the Morrisons and/or other third parties. As such, Ms. Hurles is not conceding 
that she is responsible for a $100,000 restitution award. 
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However, instead of relying on this professional accounting as the basis for the 
restitution award, the Morrisons decided to hire a law firm, Givens Pursley, which had a 
paralegal with no accounting background (05/19/'11 Tr., p.36, Ls.17-19) and little 
familiarity with the Morrisons' bookkeeping procedures (05/19/11Tr., p.36, Ls.20-25) 
add up a list of checks to determine the amount of the loss. (05/19/11 Tr., p.24, L.16 -
p.36, L.25.) According to the paralegal, Ms. Hurles' embezzled $153,920. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.32, Ls.15-17.) 
At the first restitution hearing, defense counsel established various problems with 
the spreadsheet created by Givens Pursley. Many of the checks should not have been 
attributed to Ms. Hurles embezzlement, as they were endorsed by the Morrisons, W.B., 
and D.B. Additionally, the spreadsheet included the total amount of the cashed checks, 
and did not consider the fact that Ms. Hurles was only keeping between ten and twenty 
percent of the checks. Accordingly, the Morrisons' restitution figure was inflated by 
money Ms. Hurles never stole. 
Additionally, Ms. Hurles was ordered to pay restitution for alleged thefts which 
occurred prior to those for which she pleaded guilty. Ms. Hurles was charged with thefts 
that occurred between December of 2008 and December of 2009, and Ms. Hurles 
pleaded guilty to thefts which occurred during the same period of time. However, 
Ms. Hurles' restitution order includes the losses which began in 2005. Ms. Hurles 
argues that she was not charged with, and did not plead guilty to, any thefts between 
2005 and November of 2008. As such, the restitution should not have included losses 
for any events which allegedly occurred between 2005 and November of 2008, as those 
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alleged losses are not causally related to the criminal acts for which Ms. Hurles was 
convicted. 
8. The District Court's Restitution Calculation Was Not Supported By Substantial 
And Competent Evidence 
1. The Restitution Award Included The Full Amount Of The Checks 
Ms. Hurles Cashed, Even Though She Only Took Ten To Twenty Percent 
Of The Cashed Checks 
The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the 
discretion of a district court, guided by consideration of the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-
5304(7) and by the policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer 
economic loss. State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822 (Ct App. 2010). In reviewing the 
trial court's exercise of discretion, this Court must determine whether the trial court: (1) 
correctly perceived the issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to specific choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 378 (Ct. App. 2004). The trial court is directed 
by statute to base the amount of economic loss to be awarded upon the preponderance 
of evidence submitted to the trial court by the prosecutor, defendant, victim, or 
presentence investigator. Lombard, 149 Idaho at 822 ( citing I.C. § 19-5304(6) ). The 
determination of the amount of restitution is a question of fact for the trial court whose 
findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. Id. The State has 
the burden of proving the amount of restitution. State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 497-
498 (Ct. App. 2012). 
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In determining the amount of a restitution award, the trial court, "shall consider 
the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the 
financial resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other factors 
as the court deems appropriate." Lombard, 149 Idaho at 822-823 (quoting I.C. § 19-
5304(7)). "Restitution may only be awarded for actual economic loss suffered by the 
victim." Id. at 823 (citing I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a)(2)). 
At the original restitution hearing the victims conceded that Ms. Hurles only stole 
a small percentage of the proceeds of the cashed checks. Ms. Hurles provided the 
following explanation of her criminal actions in the PSI: 
Ms. Hurles admitted that she had taken money from the ATM. She 
supported that she did this by cashing petty cash checks that were 
supposed to be used to fill the ATM. She said she would put some of the 
money in the ATM but keep some for herself. Ms. Hurles used the 
example of (verbatim), "If I cashed a check for $500, I would put $400 or 
so into the ATM and then pocket the rest." 
(PSI, p.7.) The following dialogue occurred at the first restitution hearing: 
Q [defense counsel]: So what I'm saying is, isn't it possible that Ms. Hurles 
wasn't cashing all of these checks but, instead, returning a significant 
portion back to the bar. 
A [Ms. Morrison]: I think that she's already admitted in her PSI that she 
would take checks to the bank and cash them, and a portion of that 
proceeds would go into the ATM. So I think that's pretty clear. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-17.) 
At the original restitution hearing, various problems were identified in the 
spreadsheet created by Ms. Berriochoa, including but not limited to, the fact that the 
spreadsheet did not consider that Ms. Hurles only took a small percentage of the 
proceeds of the checks she cashed. This problem was never resolved and the current 
restitution award includes the full amount of the cashed checks, even though there is 
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absolutely no evidence that Ms. Hurles stole the full amount. The following dialogue 
occurred at that hearing: 
Q [Defense Counsel]: It looks to me like what U1is spreadsheet is ... 
essentially, you've complied or you've just cataloged these checks; is that 
right? 
A [Ms. Berriochoa]: Yes. 
Q [Defense Counsel]: And your testimony here today doesn't have 
anything to do with that happened to the money with these checks; is that 
right? 
A [Ms. Berriochoa]: Correct. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.34, Ls. 7-14.) 
Ms. Berriochoa also testified that, on one page of the seventy-three page 
spreadsheet, she attributed four checks endorsed by Mr. Morrison to Ms. Hurles. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.34, L.19 - p.35, L.12.) Defense counsel asked Ms. Berriochoa if she 
"miscategorized those checks" and she said, "I have." (05/19/11 Tr., p.35, Ls.13-15.) 
Trial counsel then said, "to be honest with you, as I went through your record keeping, I 
saw a lot of miscategorizations." (05/19/11 Tr. p.25, Ls.16-19.) Trial counsel then said 
"I saw we have got two full binders of checks over there. And I saw a lot of them signed 
by Jody Morrison, I saw a lot of them signed by the Morrisons, but they made it into this 
[column] 4."6 (05/19/11 Tr., p.36, Ls.1-6.) Ms. Berriochoa also testified that she has no 
accounting background, she only had a small degree of familiarization with the 
Morrisons' bookkeeping procedures, she had no idea what happened to any of the 
6 Ms. Berriochoa testified that the spread sheet had thirteen columns and she added up 
all of the totals from columns four, five, eight, and eleven and that total, $153,920, was 
the basis for the State's restitution calculation. (05/19/1·1 Tr., p.30, L.23 - p.32, L.17.) 
The State attributed all of these checks to Ms. Hurles' restitution figure because they 
were supposed to be ones endorsed by Ms. Hurles. (05/19/11 Tr., p.30, L.23 - p.33, 
L.18.) 
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checks after they were cashed, and she had no idea who cashed $1 '14,000 of the 
checks. (05/19/11 Tr., p.33, L.23 - p.36, L.25.) 
Ms. Morrison also testified that some of the checks Ms. Berriochoa accidentally 
included in Ms. Hurles' restitution figure were in fact cashed by the Morrisons. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.50, L.18 - p.51, L.20.) Some of the checks had the initials W.8. and 
D.B., and Ms. Morrison could not identify those people. (05/19/11 Tr., p.60, L.12 - p.61, 
L.14.) 
At the final restitution/sentencing hearing, defense counsel rnade the following 
argument about the amount of restitution: 
In terms of what the actual figure was, I requested tax records. Tax 
records, they opposed on obtaining tax records. And if you take a look at 
this spreadsheet that's given -- I know we are not talking about restitution . 
. . [at this point in the hearing], but I think I need to make a record of it -- it 
really has no value whatsoever in an accounting. All you really have in that 
column on the spreadsheet is just a log of checks. We don't have what 
their profits were, we don't know what their losses were. We don't know if 
they are claiming losses on these things. I know they say that are claiming 
losses. I don't know that information, and my job my circle of responsibility 
here for Ms. Hurles is to figure out what were the profits, what were the 
losses. All I have is a window of checks that were cashed. 
If I could from my understanding -- this is basically how Ms. Hurles 
was stealing money. She would take these checks; this money was 
supposed to go into the ATM machine. By their account -- this is why I 
personally struggle with this particular case -- by their account, if we take 
that restitution figure, that means that every single check that she cashed 
she took for herself. By logical extension, what that means is that [the] 
ATM would never have any money in it. She would literally take every 
single penny that was supposed to go into the ATM. 
Ms. Hurles says what she would do was, she would go cash these 
checks. She would get ... $1,500. She would keep [$200 to $300] for 
herself and she would put [$1,200 to $1,300] in the ATM machine. What 
we don't have is ... records from the ATM machine. 
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And it's very difficult 
what was 
information. 
me to just say there is a figure out there that 
from the ATM when we don't have that 
Once again, we are bound by the accountant/client privilege, and I 
can't pursue that. So it's their choice not to reveal this information. 
(08/-11/11 Tr., p.119, L.25 - 1 , L.21.) Defense counsel then stated that twenty to 
thirty percent of the restitution requested by the Morrisons matches the $20,000 to 
$50,000 amount that Ms. Hurles admitted she stole. (08/11/11 Tr., p.122, L.20 - p.123, 
L.1.) The district court then said that "[t]here is an approximate additional $100,000 ... 
they believe was taken by her .... "7 (08/11/11 Tr., p.123, Ls.2-5.) Defense counsel 
then pointed out that those 
Tr., p.123, 
are . . . signed by 
stated: 
Morrisons." (08/11/11 
[She] may wish to file an appeal. I think I need to make a record of this last 
issue, and that is, from my perspective and the problem that we have here, 
basically, is that the Morrisons were doing the exact same thing. They 
were taking money that was supposed to go to the ATM account and they 
were cashing these checks. We have checks made out to the ATM that 
were signed by [the Morrisons]. 
(08/11/11 Tr., p.124, Ls.2-10.) The implication is that the Morrisons were requesting 
restitution from Ms. Hurles for money they removed from the ATM account and used for 
their own purposes. 
The restitution amount requested by the Morrisons was not credible, as there 
were wild ranges of restitution estimates. Based on Mr. Warr's accounting, the Boise 
Police Department concluded that the amount of money taken from the ATM was 
$108,500. (PSI, p.214.) The Morrisons told the presentence investigator that the 
7 The Morrisons agreed to not seek restitution for the $100,000 which was related to 
checks they endorsed. (08/11/11 Tr., p.123, L.2- p.124, L.10.) 
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amount of restitution they were requesting was $149,220. (PSI, p.6.) The attorney from 
Givens Pursley initially concluded that the restitution was $284, 830. (PSI, p.187.) 
In sum, there are many problems with the restitution estimates provided by the 
Morrisons. The main problem is that Ms. Hurles was only taking ten to twenty percent 
of the checks she cashed, but Ms. Berriochoa said she did not take that into 
consideration. Additionally, many of the checks were endorsed by the Morrisons, W.B., 
and D.B., but were included in the restitution total anyway. As argued in Section I, 
supra, many of these issues could have been resolved if the Morrisons' accountant, 
Mr. Warr, would have testified, but the Morrisons used the accountant-client privilege as 
a means to prevent him from clarifying the errors in the restitution total. Since none of 
these issues were resolved, the restitution ordered by the district court is not supported 
by substantial and competent evidence.8 
2. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Included Restitution For 
Checks Which Were Cashed Between 2005 And November Of 2008 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) permits a court to order restitution for any person who 
suffers an economic loss that results from a defendant's criminal activities. State v. 
Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011 ). "The statute defines victim as 'a person or entity, 
who suffers economic loss or injury as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct."' Id. 
(quoting I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i) (original emphasis)). "The term economic loss includes 
'the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and 
direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the 
criminal conduct." Id. (quoting I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a) (original emphasis)). A causal 
8 The Court of Appeals did not address this issue in the Opinion because it reversed the 
restitution award on other bases. (Opinion, p.5 n.6.) 
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connection between the defendant's criminal conduct and the injuries suffered by the 
victim must exist in order for the district court to order restitution. Id. The question of 
causation is one of fact for the district court to decide and the decision of whether to 
order restitution is left to the sound discretion of the district court. Id. The district court's 
factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal provided they are supported by 
substantial evidence. Id. 
The Information in this matter charged Ms. Hurles with grand theft for allegedly 
stealing money from the ATM at the No Lawyers Bar between December 2008 and 
December 2009. (R., pp.26-27.) The Information also charged Ms. Hurles with a 
second count of grand theft for allegedly stealing approximately $10,000 from the 
proceeds of the pull tab lottery game. (R., pp.26-27.) Ms. Hurles agreed to enter a 
guilty plea to grand theft for the ATM thefts, and the State dismissed the charge relating 
to the pull tab thefts. (02/17/11 Tr., p.1, L.19 - p.3, L.14; R., pp.33-34.) At the change 
of plea hearing, the State said it was "going to seek restitution on all DRs that were 
disclosed in discovery." (02/17/11 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-22.) Ms. Hurles then admitted to 
stealing money from the No Lawyers Bar from December 2008 to December 2009. 
(02/17/11 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.3.) After Ms. Hurles' guilty plea was entered and 
accepted by the district court, the State clarified that the restitution amount "will include 
the dismissed charge as well." (02/17/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-17.) 
At the first restitution hearing, the State was requested restitution for alleged 
thefts from the ATM which occurred from 2005 to 2010. (05/19/11 Tr., p.73, L.11 - p.74, 
L.6.) At the final restitution/sentencing hearing, Ms. Hurles stated that she only took 
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money for fourteen months. (08/11 /11 Tr., p.128, Ls:18-22.) The district court ordered 
restitution based on the State's request. (R., pp. 71-72.) 
Ms. Hurles argues that I.C. § 19-5304 only allowed the district court to award 
restitution for the alleged thefts that occurred from December of 2008 to December of 
2009, and any restitution which was based on thefts which occurred outside of that 
period should not have been included in the restitution order. As stated above, 
I.C. § 19-5304 requires a causal relationship between the criminal act and the damages 
resulting in restitution. Idaho Code Section 19-5304(1 )(b) states that, '"Found guilty of 
any crime"' shall mean a finding by a court that a defendant has committed a criminal 
act and shall include an entry of a plea of guilty, an order withholding judgment, 
suspending sentence, or entry of judgment of conviction for a misdemeanor or felony." 
When I.C. § 19-5304(1)(b) is read in light of I.C. § 19-5304('1)(a) and I.C. § 19-5304 
(1 )(e)(i), it indicates that the causal relationship must be with the actual crime to which 
the defendant was convicted. That proposition is borne out of the fact I.C. § 19-
5304(1 )(b), defines "found guilty of any crime" to mean the actual crime to which the 
defendant pleaded guilty. Since Ms. Hurles pleaded guilty to thefts which occurred from 
December 2008 to December 2009, those are the only thefts for which restitution can 
be ordered. However, the district court ordered restitution for alleged thefts which were 
not charged in the information and to which Ms. Hurles never pleaded guilty. Thus, the 
district court's restitution order runs afoul of I.C. § 19-5304 and should be recalculated 
to include only the alleged thefts from December of 2008 to December of 2009. 
Support for Ms. Hurles position is found in State v. Hargas, 126 Idaho 727, 730 
(Ct. App. 1995), where it was held that in the event multiple charges are brought and 
35 
some are dismissed, an agreement to restitution 
for injuries or by the dismissed 
On review, the State asserts that the plea agreement includes restitution going 
back to 2005. (Respondent's Brief On Review, pp.11-18.) There are various reasons 
why the State's assertion that Ms. Hurles agreed to pay restitution for uncharged 
conduct is problematic. First, the prosecutor indicated an intent to "seek" restitution "on 
all DRs that were disclosed in discovery." (02/17/11 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-22.) The mere fact 
that the State was going to seek restitution for certain amounts of money does not mean 
that Ms. Hurles expressly agreed to pay restitution for those amounts of money. See 
State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 495-498 (Ct. App. 12). 
More importantly, the foregoing "terms" of the plea agreement are far 
ambiguous to be enforceable against Ms. Hurles. "(\JV]here the language of [a] plea 
agreement is ambiguous, those ambiguities shall be resolved in favor of the defendant." 
State v. Acuna, 154 Idaho 139, 141 (Ct. App. 2013). "In determining whether a contract 
is ambiguous, our task is to ascertain whether the contract is reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretations." Id. 
The term "DRs" is ambiguous because it is not defined anywhere in the record. It 
could be a reference to the dismissed charge. This would be consistent with the State's 
comment at the end of the change of plea hearing where the State said that the 
restitution amount "will include the dismissed charge as well." (02/17/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-
17.) It could be a reference to restitution for an unrelated case. This would be 
consistent with the guilty plea advisory form where Ms. Hurles indicated that she had 
agreed to pay restitution in another case. (R., p.40.) One could speculate as to various 
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meaning of "DRs," as that term is not defined in the record and the State never 
attempted to define that term at the change of plea hearing. Since there are a 
multitude of meanings for the phrase "DRs" there is an ambiguity which should be 
resolved in Ms. Hurles' favor. Ms. Hurles argues that the most reasonable interpretation 
of the term "DRs" is that it is a reference to the dismissed charge. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with Ms. Hurles and held that since the State only 
said it would "seek" restitution, the "words of the agreement include no expression of 
consent by Hurles to pay any amount of restitution or to pay for any specified economic 
loss beyond the crime charged." (Opinion, p.11.) 'The words of the agreement only 
inform the court of what the State would try to recover; 'It did not relieve the State of its 
burden to prove any amount of restitution claimed .... "' (Opinion, p.11 (citing Nienburg 
153 Idaho at 814-815).) 
The Court of Appeals also held that even if it "were to stretch the plea agreement 
to include consent, the plain language of the plea agreement does not express what 
Ms. Hurles agreed to pay restitution for." (Opinion, p.11.) It further reasoned that the 
record does not indicate what "DRs" mean and "if 'DRs' refer to some time period 
outside of the time period charged." (Opinion, p.11.) The Court then held that the 
ambiguity must be interpreted in Ms. Hurles' favor. 9 (Opinion, pp.11-12.) 
9 The Court of Appeals also pointed out that at the final restitution/sentencing hearing, 
the district court summarized the plea agreement and said that Ms. Hurles was paying 
restitution for "all incidences, not simply the one grand theft charge, but the entire time 
that you were working for the employer and any thefts that may have occurred," and 
Ms. Hurles said that was her understanding of the prior proceedings. (Opinion, p.12.) 
The Court of Appeals then held: 
We are not convinced that Hurles' statement to the court is consent 
to pay restitution. Instead, the statement merely offers Hurles' 
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a final Hu consistently stated she did not 
until her husband lost his job in (PSI, pp.6-7., 08/11/11 Tr., p.1 1 
. ) More importantly, Morrison primarily based her belief that Ms. Hurles began 
stealing in 2004 on nothing more than admitted speculation. Specifically, Ms. Morrison 
told the presentence investigator "her theft over the last 6 years (we have to assume it 
has been going on her whole length of employment in one way or another) .... " (PSI, 
p.5.) Even though the No Lawyers Bar had accounting discrepancies that went back to 
2004, many of those could be explained by the fact that the Morrisons might have been 
taking money out of the ATM in the same manner as Ms. Hurles. (08/11/11 Tr., p.1 
0.) This position is further supported by the fact that the Morrisons were willing to 
forgo approximately $100,000 of their original restitution estimate after defense counsel 
pointed out that the Morrisons were the ones who endorsed those checks. (08/11 /11 
Tr., p.122, L.10- p.124, L.10.) As argued in Section I, supra, this could have been 
cleared up had the Morrisons allowed their accountant, Mr. Warr, to testify as to his 
restitution estimate. 
acquiescence to the court's description of what had happened in the prior 
proceedings. Moreover, a defendant's acquiescence to a district court's 
error in recalling what the plea agreement was does not pollute the waters 
upstream. As we recognized in Nienburg, the district court's error 
applying the restitution statute or recalling the restitution terms does not 
obliterate the plea agreement that the defendant and the State agreed to, 
nor is the State's burden changed. What is more, if we accept the State's 
contention, it would be quite perplexing for a district court to announce that 
it is ordering restitution and then seek consent when section 19-5304(9) 
mandates the court to first have "consent of the parties" in order to award 
restitution outside of section 19-5304(2). 
(Opinion, p.12 (original emphasis).) 
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In sum, I.C § 19-5304 requires that there be a causal relationship between the 
charged offense and the injuries suffered by the victim in order for restitution to be 
awarded to cover the cost of those injuries. In this case, the district court ordered 
restitution for uncharged conduct in contravention of I .C. § 19-5304. As such, a new 
restitution hearing should be ordered in order for restitution to be calculated in 
compliance with I.C. § 19-5304. 
3. The Fundamental Error Standard Is Not Applicable To Ms. Hurles' Claim 
Of Error 
In its Respondent's Brief on Review, the State argues, for the first time in this 
appeal, that Ms. Hurles' claim that she did not agree to pay restitution for uncharged 
conduct was not preserved below and, therefore, is subject to the fundamental error test 
adopted by this Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). (Respondent's Brief On 
Review, pp.17-18.) In order to make a showing of fundamental error, the defendant 
must demonstrate: (1) the error was of constitutional magnitude - i.e. one or more of 
the defendant's un-waived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error was plain on 
the face of the record and that the failure to object was not the product of a tactical 
decision; and (3) the error was prejudicial, which requires the defendant to show a 
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the outcome of the proceedings. Id. 
at 226. 
Ms. Hurles argues that this standard is not applicable to her restitution claims 
because she is merely arguing that there is no causal relationship between the actual 
charge to which she pleaded guilty and the alleged injuries the victims sustained 
between 2005 and November 2008. There is no difference between this argument and 
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arguing that a district court's factual findings are not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Ms. Hurles is not aware of any authority requiring a defendant to 
object to a factual finding made by a district court in order to challenge that finding on 
appeal. In other words, the district court's order requiring Ms. Hurles to pay restitution 
outside of the charged time period is an adverse ruling which she can challenge on 
appeal, absent an objection. See McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397 (2003) ("To 
properly raise an issue on appeal there must either be an adverse ruling by the court 
below or the issue must have been raised in the court below, an issue cannot be raised 
for the first time on appeal."). 
Ms. Hurles' claim of error is not subject to the fundamental error standard 
because the district court's restitution award constitutes a factual finding which is an 
adverse ruling. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Included Civil Attorneys' Fees As Part 
Of The Restitution Awarded In The Criminal Proceedings 
A. Introduction 
The Morrisons, owners of the No Lawyers Bar, hired a civil law firm, Givens 
Pursley, to litigate issues tangentially related to Ms. Hurles' embezzlement. It appears 
that the Morrisons sued their accountant, Mr. Warr, Mr. Warr's firm, and U.S. Bank, and 
intervened in Ms. Hurles' Bankruptcy. (PSI, p.52; Opinion, p.13.) Additionally, Givens 
Pursley helped the Morrisons prepare for the criminal restitution hearing in this case and 
billed $14,876.73 for its efforts. (PSI, p.52.) Givens Pursley's total bill for all this ligation 
was $48,734.61, which was included in the restitution award over Ms. Hurles' 
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objection. 10 Ms. Hurles argues that the district Court erred when it included the civil 
attorneys' fees in the restitution order, as civil attorneys' fees have been characterized 
as non-economic damages which are not awardable pursuant to Idaho's criminal 
restitution statute l.C. §19-5304. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Included Civil Attorneys' Fees 
As Part Of The Restitution Awarded In The Criminal Proceedings 
As a preliminary note, the applicable standards of review has been articulated in 
Sections 11(8)(1) and 11(8)(2), supra, and are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
Idaho Code Section 19-5304(11 ), states that "[a]n order of restitution shall not 
preclude the victim from seeking any other legal remedy." However, "[o]ne of the 
purposes of restitution is to obviate the need for victims to incur the cost and 
inconvenience of a separate civil action in order to gain compensation for their losses." 
State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78 (Ct. App. 2010). Additionally, l.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a) 
"disallows restitution for noneconomic damages that might be available in a civil lawsuit, 
such as pain and suffering, wrongful death, emotional distress, and the like." Id. 
The issue of the availability for civil attorneys' fees under I.C. § 19-5304 was 
addressed in State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165 (Ct. App. 2006). In that case, the 
defendant, Ms. Parker, was working as a bookkeeper for the victims and cashed 
approximately $18,000 of unauthorized checks. Id. at 166. Ms. Parker was charged 
with ten counts of forgery and, in addition, the victim filed a civil action against 
Ms. Parker and others. Id. Ms. Parker then pleaded guilty to one count of forgery and 
10 The district court entered a restitution order separately listing the amounts of 
restitution for the stolen money and the attorneys' fees. (R., pp.71-72.) 
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the remaining counts were dismissed. Id. The district court then entered a withheld 
judgment and placed Ms. Parker on probation. Id. As a term of her probation, 
Ms. Parker was required to pay restitution for the forged checks and she was required 
to pay $16,·133.75 for attorneys' fees the victim incurred in the civil case. Id. at 166-
·167. Ms. Parker appealed and argued that the victim's attorneys' fees "were not a 
direct economic loss resulting from her criminal conduct, and therefore not appropriate 
as restitution or as a condition of probation." Id. at 167. 
In resolving this issue, the Court of Appeals first held that I.C. § 19-5304(2) only 
allows restitution to be ordered for economic loss. Id. The Court then held that a 
victimized business could recover, as restitution, salaries it paid its employees "for 
investigating the extent of the defendant's theft." Id. However, the Court reasoned that 
"[i]t does not follow, however, that restitution rnay be ordered pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304 
for any out-of-pocket expense that the victim would not have incurred but for the 
defendant's crime." Id. (original emphasis). In fact, the Court had previously held that in 
some instances the expense of preventing future harm "was not compensable through a 
restitution order ... [as] a victim's own assessment of actions necessary to respond to a 
crime is not the correct measure for restitution under section 19-5304." Id. (citing 
State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624 (Ct. App. 2004)). The Court of Appeals held as 
follows: 
With these authorities in mind, we conclude that the principal 
question in assessing the restitution award for attorney fees in the present 
case is whether the attorney fees for filing the civil lawsuit were an expense 
that was necessary in order for the victim to recover the losses caused by 
Parker's forgeries. It is apparent that they were not. The only claim alleged 
in the civil complaint relating to the forged checks was for the amount of the 
forged checks, which is precisely what the victim was clearly entitled to 
receive and did receive in the restitution order. The victim's civil complaint 
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also claimed damages for overpayment of wages that resulted from Parker 
submitting false time sheets, and for conspiracy and unjust enrichment 
related to two other defendants. None of these additional damages are 
alleged to have resulted from the forgeries. Under these circumstances, the 
lawsuit and the associated attorney fees were unnecessary to recover the 
victim's direct loss caused by the forgeries, for that loss was entirely 
compensable through the restitution order in the criminal case. Any 
judgment that the victim might have recovered in the civil litigation for the 
forged checks would have been duplicative of the restitution ordered in the 
criminal case. Therefore, the attorney fees related to the lawsuit are not an 
economic loss compensable through a restitution order under I.C. § 19-
5304(1 )(a). 
Id. at 168. The Court of Appeals also addressed a separate issue dealing with the 
question of whether the victim's same civil attorney fees could be ordered as a term of 
the defendant's probation. Id. The Court of Appeals' holding follows: 
[\!V]e conclude that the ordered payment of the victim's attorney fees was 
not a permissible condition of probation. As explained above, the victim's 
civil action encornpassed several claims that were not based upon the 
charged forgeries and also encompassed claims against third persons. It 
therefore is not clear whether or to what extent the attorney fees represent 
"resulting harm" from the crime to which Parker pleaded guilty. Of equal 
importance, the validity of the victim's civil claims against Parker, other than 
the claim for the forgery, have not been adjudicated. Parker's guilty plea in 
the criminal case did not include an admission of the other alleged 
wrongdoing delineated in the victim's civil complaint, and there has been 
no judicial determination that Parker bears liability on those claims. It was 
premature, therefore, for the trial court to order Parker's payment of 
attorney fees incurred by the victim to pursue claims of unknown validity. 
The merits of the underlying claims, and of the victim's request for an 
award of attorney fees incurred in pursuing those claims, must be 
determined in the civil action. 
Id. at 168-169. 
In this case, Ms. Hurles objected to the inclusion of the attorneys' fees at the 
original restitution hearing. (05/19/11 Tr., p.84, Ls.18-19.) The district court ultimely 
ordered Ms. Hurles to pay $48,734.61 for attorneys' fees. (R., pp. 71-72.) 
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district court when it included the civil the its 
Mr. Warr's firm, and U The nature of civil lawsuits in 
matter are somewhat unclear, however, the lawsuit against Mr. Warr was based on a 
breach of duty he owed as an accountant to the Morrisons. (08/04/11 Tr., p.12, L.16 -
p.14, L.5.) The lawsuit against Mr. Warr's firm was probably based on the breach of the 
same duty. Under the holdings in Parker, these attorneys' fees are not compensable 
because they are not based Ms. Hurles' thefts, but Mr. Warr's alleged breach of his duty 
to the Morrisons. Further, it is a lawsuit against a third party which was also a reason to 
deny the restitution award in Parker. The basis for the lawsuit against U.S. Bank is 
unclear from the record, but at a minimum the attorneys' fees for that lawsuit are not 
compensable under the reasoning in Parker because, as with the lawsuit against 
Mr. Warr, it is against a third party. Finally, none of these lawsuits were final at the time 
of the restitution/sentencing hearings, and that same lack of finality was another reason 
why restitution could not be ordered for the civil lawsuits in Parker. (08/11/11 
Tr., p.118, L.24 - p.119, L.5, 125, L.25 - p.126, L.4.) The Court of Appeals agreed with 
Ms. Hurles and held that the attorneys' fees for the lawsuits against Mr. Warr, 
Mr. Warr's firm, and U.S. Bank were not direct economic losses and, therefore, they 
were not awardable as restitution under their holding in Parker and I.C. § 19-5304. 
(Opinion, pp.13-14.) 
Ms. Hurles also argues that the attorneys' fees associated with the Morrisons' 
intervention in her bankruptcy was not compensable because the only logical reason for 
the Morrisons to intervene in the Hurles' bankruptcy would be to secure funds from the 
bankruptcy estate. The Court of Appeals did not agree with Ms. Hurles and held that 
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for the Morrisons' to "protect the right 
to recover the directly caused by the . the 
[Morrisons') claim against Hurles might have been discharged in bankruptcy." (Opinion, 
pp:15-16 (citing In re Dean, 359 B.R. 218,221 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006).) 
The Court of Appeals' holding that the Morrisons had to intervene in Ms. Hurles' 
bankruptcy to prevent their criminal restitution from being discharged does not comport 
with bankruptcy law because restitution ordered in state criminal proceedings is not 
dischargeable in federal bankruptcy proceedings. In Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 
(1986), 11 the United States Supreme Court held that criminal restitution orders are 
automatically excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). 12 According to the 
10th Circuit, "[e]ven though § 523(a)(7) on its face does not except from discharge a 
'fine, penalty, or forfeiture' that is 'compensation for actual pecuniary loss,' which seems 
to accurately describe a criminal restitution obligation, the Supreme Court concluded 
that in enacting § 523(a)(7) as part of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code (the 'Code'), Congress 
could not have intended to render restitution obligations dischargeable, because it was 
well settled in pre-Code case law that restitution was not dischargeable." Williams, 438 
B.R. at 688 (citing Kelly, 479 U.S. at 43-47). The Supreme Court held that it would not 
interpret 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) to abrogate the federal judiciary's "historical aversion to 
11 The case the Court of Appeals relied on did not deal with criminal restitution, as the 
debt in that case was an "unsecured loan on personal injury recovery." In re Dean, 359 
B.R. at 219. It should be noted that under federal bankruptcy law, "a debt arising from a 
criminal sanction is distinct from a debt arising from a contract ... or a debt arising from 
a tort .... " Williams v. Meyer, 438 B.R. 679, 687 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2010). 
12 'The relevant portion of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) provides that a discharge does not 
discharge any debt 'to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to 
and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary 
loss."' Williams, 438 B.R. at 686-687 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)). 
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altering state criminal sentences in bankruptcy" absent an express provision intending 
such an outcome. Id. According to the United States Supreme Court: 
Our interpretation of the Code also must reflect the basis for this 
judicial exception, a deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should 
not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings. The right to 
formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an important aspect of the 
sovereignty retained by the States. This Court has emphasized repeatedly 
"the fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal 
prosecutions." 
Kelly, 479 U.S. 4 7 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971 )). 
It should also be noted that the federal courts have rejected the notion that 
dischargeability of criminal restitution can vary depending on an individual state's 
restitution scheme. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a debtor's 
argument, in reliance on the Kelly Opinion, that criminal restitution can be discharged in 
the State of Washington because the purpose of restitution in that State is to benefit the 
victim as opposed to benefit the State. Steiger v. Washington, 159 B.R. 907, 910-911 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit also rejected the argument that restitution is 
dischargeable in Washington because it can be ordered as a term of probation and is, 
therefore, not part of the criminal sentence. Id. at 911-912. In light of the Ninth Circuit's 
broad reading of Kelly, Idaho's individualized restitution scheme is not a basis for 
holding that criminal restitution ordered in Idaho is dischargeable in federal bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
Since criminal restitution is automatically excepted from discharge in bankruptcy 
proceedings, the Morrisons had no reason to intervene in Ms. Hurles' bankruptcy. 
Therefore, the district court erred when it awarded attorneys' fees for the intervention in 




necessary for the Morrisons to intervene in the Hurles' bankruptcy in order to prevent 
the criminal restitution from being discharged. 
Ms. Hurles also argues that the award of civil attorneys' fees in the amount 
$14,876.73 for a paralegal to create a spreadsheet constitutes an abuse of discretion, 
as those fees are unreasonable. It is hard to fathom how Givens Pursley accumulated 
$14,876.73 in fees to create a spreadsheet, especially since Mr. Warr, a certified public 
accountant, had already conducted a professional accounting of the Morrisons' losses. 
(PSI, pp.3, 213-214.) The work appears somewhat duplicative, as Mr. Warr's work 
product was used in the presentence investigation and, as argued in Section I, supra, 
was heavily relied on to establish the Morrisons' restitution estimate. (PSI, p.3.) 
Moreover, this work should have been performed by an accountant, as the $14,876.73 
spreadsheet was replete with errors and only caused confusion. 13 See Section ll(B)(1 ), 
supra. In fact, Givens Pursley estimated that the amount of restitution was $284,839 
(PSI, p.188), and that estimate was so unreliable the restitution ultimately ordered was 
$155,440. (R., pp.71-72.) When Ms. Morrisons was asked at the restitution hearing if 
she could account for the fact that Ms. Hurles was only taking a portion of the 
proceedings of the cashed check, Ms. Morrison relied on Mr. Warr's accounting, not 
Ms. Berriochoa's spreadsheet. (05/11/19 Tr., p.71, L.8 - p.73, L.10.) When Mr. Warr 
reviewed the spreadsheet with trial counsel he concluded that "a lot of that information 
13 Ms. Berriochoa, the paralegal that created the spreadsheet, testified that she has no 
accounting background, she only had a small degree of familiarization with the 
Morrisons' bookkeeping procedures, she miscategorized some of the checks in the 
spreadsheet, she had no idea what happened to any of the checks' proceeds after they 
were cashed, and she had no idea who cashed $114,000 of the checks. (05/19/11 
Tr., p.24, L.16 - p.26, L.22, p.33, L.23 - p.36, L.25.) 
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is incorrect." (05/19/11 Tr., p.80, L.13 - p.81, L.2.) As such, the district court abused its 
discretion when it ordered unreasonable attorneys' fees because the spreadsheet was 
an unreliable duplication of Mr. Warr's prior accounting of the amount of losses from the 
ATM. 
Ms. Hurles recognizes that the Court of Appeals held that the attorneys' fees for 
preparation for the restitution hearing were necessary and, therefore, awardable under 
I.C. § 19-5304. (Opinion, p.16.) However, Ms. Hurles stands by her contention that 
they are unreasonable. 
In the event this Court grants relief based on the argument set forth in Section 
11(8)(2), supra, Ms. Hurles also argues that the $14,876.73 figure should be recalculated 
to exclude time billed for cataloguing checks falling outside of the December 2008 to 
December 2009 time period, as restitution based on that work is not causally related to 
the actions for which Ms. Hurles was convicted. Again, the Court of Appeals also 
agreed with this argument and held that the fees should be adjusted and only include 
the time frame between December 2008 to December 2009. (Opinion, p.16.) 
In sum, the attorneys' fees for the third party lawsuits are not compensable 
economic damages under I.C. § 19-5304 and the Parker holding because those 
lawsuits were against third parties and were not final at the time of the 
restitution/sentencing hearing. Additionally, the lawsuit against Mr. Warr was based on 
an alleged breach of a duty he owed to the Morrisons and were, therefore, not based on 
the Ms. Hurles' charged thefts. It was also unnecessary for the Morrisons to intervene 
in the Hurles' bankruptcy as criminal restitution is automatically excepted from 
discharge in federal bankruptcy proceedings. As such, the district court abused its 
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discretion when it ordered civil attorneys' fees as part of the criminal restitution because 
that decision did not comport with the applicable legal standards. Additionally, the 
district court abused its discretion when it ordered civil attorneys' fees for the work 
performed in preparation of the restitution hearing as that work was unreliable, 
duplicative, and therefore, unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Hurles respectfully requests that this case be remanded for another 
restitution hearing with instructions that the district court allow Mr. \Narr to testify and 
that restitution only be ordered for the thefts which occurred from December 2008 to 
December of 2009. Ms. Hurles also requests an instruction consistent with this Court's 
rulings on the issues relating to the civil attorneys' fees. In the event this Court 
determines that the Morrisons did not waive the accountant-client privilege, or any other 
claim of error is deemed meritless, Ms. Hurles alternatively requests that this case be 
remanded for new restitution hearing with applicable instructions as to any of 
Ms. Hurles' prevailing claims of error. 
DATED this 31 st day of July, 2014. 
SHAWN F. WIL..KERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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